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I FIRST GOT TO KNOW JACK GRUNA WALT when I participated in some of the symposia he organized at the Naval War College. I soon realised that 
he was a great organizer, full of enthusiasm, and possessed of a warm 
personality. In my two years as Stockton Professor ofInternational Law at the 
College, I have come to value him as a colleague and friend-and almost as the 
father of a small family of fellow workers. 
As a former British Army officer with a somewhat restricted knowledge of 
maritime law, I had some fears associated with being in an Oceans Law and 
Policy Department. But Jack made me welcome and integrated me into his 
team. It did not take me long to realise that here was a man with catholic 
interests willing to listen to another's views, even though they might be radical 
and perhaps even "revolutionary." Discussing one's views with him would 
often result in a modification of one's radicalism, and certainly a clarification of 
doubt. It soon became clear that Jack's views and interests were wide in the 
extreme, and he was obviously prepared to share them. 
Having heard Jack lecture and seen his rapport with a class of officers from a 
variety of commands and countries, I soon recognised that he i~ a born teacher. 
The Law of War 
Jack is also very modest. Soon after I joined the College, he told me that he did 
not consider himself a true professor since he had never held an academic 
appointment. I reminded him that he held a professorial appointment at a 
recognized and highly respected institute of specialized and higher learning and 
that having watched him in action, I know that he is more than adequately 
entitled to be addressed as Professor. 
It is with great delight that I find myself among those of his amici 
contributing to this Liber Amicorum in honour of Jack Grunawalt. 
It has often been claimed that modem international law is Eurocentric in 
character. This somewhat chauvinistic attitude is frequently based on 
comments in the works of the "fathers" of international law, many of whom 
were Christian monks. l It is a view strengthened by pointing out that" [t] he era 
of the independent territorial State began in earnest with the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War and the political 
hegemony asserted by the Roman Catholic Church."z Such an attitude, 
however, tends to minimize the significance of the system that prevailed in 
ancient and medieval times. From earliest times it had been recognized that 
some restraints were necessary during armed conflict. Thus, we find numerous 
references in the Old Testament wherein God imposes limitations on the 
warlike activities of the Israelites. It is true that the Israelites were frequently 
enjoined to slaughter all the inhabitants of the cities they captured,3 but this 
was only when the war was waged at the direct instruction of God and normally 
against heathens who rejected Him; to show mercy to the enemy would 
constitute a sin against the Lord.4 The Prophets tell us that in other wars the 
victorious Israelites made the inhabitants of conquered territories slaves unless 
they paid tribute.5 If peace was not accepted upon defeat, the males were to be 
slain, while women and children were to be spared, but made slaves. The rabbis 
modified this so that their status became that of servants rather than slaves. 
Prisoners of war were to be treated humanely and not slain, as Elisha 
informed his king when asked if he might kill them.6 In the days of the kingdom, 
this was the common practice, for "if thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to 
eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink."7 Not only were the innocent 
to be protected, but precautions were also to be taken not to harm the local 
fauna and flora, subject to the needs of military necessity. Thus, soldiers were 
told not to destroy trees or fruit, other than that which was required for food or 
the building of defenses.8 Josephus9 interpreted this to mean that the land was 
not to be set on fire nor beasts of burden slaughtered.lo In fact, commenting on 
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Jewish behavior during conflict in biblical times, one commentator has 
remarked: 
The rabbisll softened the impact of much of the old law through 
reinterpretation or imaginative explanation. Due to this it seems that the 
Israelites were indeed a "merciful" people when compared with their neighbours, 
such as the Assyrians. Although, as in any case, exceptions and violations to 
regulations occurred, on the whole, the Israelite warriors conducted themselves 
in a disciplined, restricted manner in accordance with rules and regulations 
derived from divine inspirationY 
It must be borne in mind, however, that, for the main part, the penalty for 
disregarding the imprecations concerning conduct in combat were punishable 
only by religious, that is to say divine, sanction. 
The Israelites were not the only ancient people to consider it necessary to 
impose some measure of control on their warlike activities. Sun Tzu 
maintained that in war one should only attack the enemy armies, for "the worst 
policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative."13 As 
early as the seventeenth century B.C., the Chinese, when resorting to war, 
limited their activities by a conscious application of principles of chivalry.14 
This may be seen in the refusal of the Duke of Sung's minister of war to attack 
an unready enemy, while it was "deemed unchivalrous among Chinese chariot 
aristocrats [to take] advantage of a fleeing enemy who was having trouble with 
his chariot (he might even be assisted), [to] injure a ruler, [or to] attack an 
enemy state when it was mourning a ruler or was divided by internal troubles." 
The sacred writings of ancient India equally sought to introduce some 
measure of humanitarianism. The Mahabharata1S states that "a king should 
never do such an injury to his foe as would rankle the latter's heart, no sleeping 
enemy should be attacked, and with death our enmity is terminated.,,16 The 
Laws of Manu, promulgated at approximately the same period, postulate that: 
when the king fights his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed, 
nor with barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazed with fire .... These 
are the weapons of the wicked.17 
Moreover, it was generally recognized that proportionality between the 
combatants was a requirement, so that elephants should be used only against 
elephants, in the same way as foot soldiers would fight against foot soldiers. 18 
Similarly, the Ramayana19 condemned weapons which could "destroy the entire 
race of the enemy, including those which could not bear arms ... because such 
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destruction en masse was forbidden by the ancient laws of war, even though 
[the enemy] was fighting an unjust war with an unrighteous objective."zo The 
Mahabharata, too, forbade the use of "hyperdestructive" weapons, since these 
were "not even moral, let alone in conformity with religion or the recognized 
rules of warfare."Z1 
In ancient Greece, among the city States: 
[T] emples and priests and embassies were considered inviolable .... Mercy ... 
was shown to helpless captives. Prisoners were ransomed and exchanged. 
Safe-conducts were granted and respected. Truces and armistices were 
established and, for the most part, faithfully observed .... Burial of the dead was 
permitted; and graves were unmolested. It was considered wrong and impious to 
cut off the enemy's water supply, or to make use of poisoned weapons,zz 
Treacherous stratagems of every description were condemned as being contrary 
to civilized warfare.23 
In so far as Rome was concerned, practices: 
[V] aried according as their wars were commenced to exact vengeance for gross 
violations of international law, or for deliberate acts of treachery. Their warlike 
usa"ges varied also according as their adversaries were regular enemies . . . or 
uncivilized barbarians and bands of pirates and marauders .... [T]he belligerent 
operations of Rome, from the point of view of introducing various mitigations in 
the field, and adopting a milder policy after victory, are distinctly of a progressive 
character. They were more regular and disciplined than those of any other 
ancient nation. . . . The ius belli imposed restrictions on barbarism, and 
condemned all acts of treachery .... [Livy tells us] there were laws of war as well 
as peace, and the Romans had learnt to put them into practice not less justly than 
bravely .... The Romans [says Ciceroz4] refuse to countenance a criminal 
attempt made on the life of even a foreign aggressor.25 
The rules of war in both Greece and Rome were, indeed: 
[A]pplicable only to civilized sovereign States, properly organized, and enjoying 
a regular constitution; and not to conglomerations ofindividuals living together 
in an irregular and precarious association. Rome did not regard as being within 
the comity of nations such fortuitous gatheri~gs of people, but only those who 
were organized on a civilized basis, and governed with a view to the general good, 
by a properly constructed system of law .... Hence barbarians, savage tribes, 
bands of robbers and pirates, and the like were debarred from the benefits and 
relaxations established by international law and custom .... [A]s to the general 
practice of war in Hellas, we find remarkable oscillations of warlike policy. Brutal 
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treatment and noble generous conduct are manifested at the same epoch, in the 
same war, and apparently under similar circumstances. At times we hear of 
proceedings which testify to the intellectual and artistic temperament of the 
Greeks; at other times, we read narratives which emphasize the fundamental 
cruelty and disregard of human claims prevalent among the ancient races when 
at war with each other. In Homer ... hostilities for the most part assumed the 
form of indiscriminate brigandage, and were but rarely conducted with a view to 
achieving regular conquests, and extending the territory of the victorious 
community. Extermination rather than subjection of the enemy was the usual 
practice .... Sometimes prisoners were sacrificed to the gods, corpses mutilated, 
and mercy refused to children, and to the old and sickly. On the other hand, acts 
of mercy and nobility were frequent .... The adoption of certain, cowardly, 
inhuman practices ... was condemned .... In reference to the conduct of war in 
Greece, it is important to remember that it was between small States, whose 
subjects were to an extraordinary degree animated by patriotism and devotion to 
their mother-country, that each individual was much more affected by hostilities 
than are the cities of the large modem States, that every individual was a 
soldier-politician who saw his home, his life, his family, his gods at stake, and, 
finally, that he regarded each and every subject of the opposing State as his 
personal adversary.26 
It has been pointed out that the situation in ancient Greece appears to have 
changed somewhat after Homer's time and that by the fifth century B.C., both 
Euripides27 and Thucydides28 were able to write of the "common customs 
(koina nomima) of the Hellenes," which, in regard to the law of war, may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. The state of war should be officially declared before commencing 
hostilities against an appropriate foe; sworn treaties and alliances should be 
regarded as binding. 
2. Hostilities are sometimes inappropriate; sacred truces, especially 
those declared for the celebration of the Olympic games, should be observed. 
3. Hostilities against certain persons and in certain places are 
inappropriate; the inviolability of sacred places and persons under protection of 
the gods, especially heralds and suppliants, should be respected. 
4. Erecting a battlefield trophy indicates victory; such trophies 
should be respected. 
5. After a battle it is right to return enemy dead when asked; to 
request the return of one's dead is tantamount to admitting defeat. 
6. A battle is properly prefaced by a ritual challenge and acceptance 
of the challenge. 
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7. Prisoners of war should be offered for ransom rather than being 
summarily executed or mutilated. 
8. Punishment of surrendered opponents should be restrained. 
9. War is an affair of warriors, thus noncombatants should not be 
primary targets of attack. 
10. Battles should be fought during the usual (summer) campaigning 
season. 
11. Use of nonhoplite29 arms should be limited. 
12. Pursuit of defeated and retreating opponents should be limited in 
duration.3o 
By the time of the wars with Persia, the Peloponnesian War, and the changes in 
the nature of Greek life, these rules were no longer of general validity.31 
As to the situation in Rome, and as a commentary upon the effects of its 
practices, it has been suggested that 
[T]he conduct of war [in Rome] was essentially unrestrained. Prisoners could be 
enslaved or massacred; plunder was general; and no distinction was recognized 
between combatants and noncombatants. Classical Latin, indeed, lacked even 
a word for a civilian. The merciless savagery of Roman war in this sense carried 
on into the invasion period of the fifth and sixth centuries .... In practice 
[,however,] Roman war was not always so savage. But such was the 
understanding of Roman war with which medieval theorists of war worked, and 
they erected bellum Romanum in this sense into a category of warfare which 
permitted the indiscriminate slaughter or enslavement of entire populations 
without distinction between combatant and noncombatant status. This was a 
style of warfare appropriate only against a non-Roman enemy, and in the 
Middle Ages this came to mean that Christians ought only employ it against 
pagans ... .'132 
In line with the practices described in the Old Testament, similar principles 
applied in the Islamic world. The Caliph Abu Bakr commanded his forces "let 
there be no perfidy, no falsehood in your treaties with the enemy, be faithful to 
all things, proving yourselves upright and noble and maintaining your word and 
promises truly.'133 Similarly, the leading Islamic statement on the law of nations 
written in the ninth century forbids the killing of women, children and the old 
or blind, the crippled and the helplessly insane.34 Moreover, during combat, 
"Muslims were under legal obligations to respect the rights of non-Muslims, 
both combatants and civilians .... [T]he prisoner of war should not be killed, 
but he may be ransomed or set free by grace.,,35 However, if it was considered 
that his death would be advantageous to the Muslims, he might be killed, 
unless he converted to Islam. Unlike the Old Testament ban on destruction of 
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the land and its products, Islam permitted the inundation or burning of a city, 
even though protected persons, including Muslims, might thus be killed.36 
During the Middle Ages, rules of chivalry applied as between the orders of 
knighthood, although these did not operate to protect the foot soldiers or the 
yeomenry. By the middle of the fifteenth century, a sufficient number of works 
were being written on the rules of chivalry as to make it possible to say that: 
[B]y the 14'h century, medieval Christendom had developed a law of arms, the jus 
militare, well understood and applied by the military and feudal jurisdictions of 
Western Europe. The theoretical bases of that law followed the medieval legal 
and theological theories of the hierarchy of legal systems, namely, the Law of 
God, the eternal law; the law of nature; the jus gentium, its more practical 
counterpart; and human positive law .... The jus militare which governed the 
conduct of the members of the honourable profession of arms was considered a 
part of the jus gentium, being part of the customs of those who were professional 
men-at-arms and members of the Orders of chivalry where the standards of 
Christian and military behaviour were meant to meet .... The jus militare being 
seen as a part of the jus gentium, the practical legal consequences followed that it 
was a body of rules understood and applied throughout the length and breadth of 
Christendom, then subject to the divided regimes of sacerdotium and imperium, of 
papacy and emperor. The heralds and older knights were considered periti in the 
law of arms, while writers such as ... Christine de Pis an, a woman writer whose 
work Uvre des Fays d'Armes et de Chivalerie (1407) ... [were] regarded as 
authorities and cited in the jurisdictions where the law of arms was applied.37 In 
the Councils of Princes, in military and feudal courts, learned canonists argued 
with erudition and skill the complex matters arising out of warfare before the 
experienced knights who composed the military jurisdictions. In cases of 
difficulty, the heralds were consulted as the repositories oflearning on the law of 
arms. 
These cases were often concerned with claims to ransom, to booty and spoils, 
rather than with the enforcement of honourable conduct in warfare .... So far as 
trials of soldiers in enemy allegiance were concerned, we see a universality of 
jurisdiction which is not easy to explain. Doubtless the close nexus of the law of 
arms with the jus gentium went part of the way to explain this .... The military 
calling is seen as a jealous and exclusive one, intimately associated with the 
concept of honour .... The bearing of arms is so much a matter of honour that 
those who do not bear arms are without honour; it is a matter of honour to be 
allowed to bear arms .... [W]hat we would today call criminal conduct in warfare 
was seen as a violation of that honour upon which the right to bear arms was 
based. A medieval war crime is a breach of the law of arms,38 it is more specifically 
an act contra fidem et jus gentium . ... Honour is the root of the law of arms. Those 
who commit acts of dishonour act contrary to the faith and honour of a knight. 
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The law of arms controls and regulates acts of warfare by the professional and 
chivalric military classes. We can also discern a universality of jurisdiction to 
entertain such allegations of dishonourable acts in warfare. The law of arms 
being the measure of such honour binds all those who follow the profession of 
arms in Christendom and at all places where Christians perform feats of arms. 
The jus gentium of which the law of arms formed part has given us the legacy of 
universal jurisdiction over war criminality.39 
As with ancient India, the orders of knighthood condemned the use of 
certain weapons, especially those which were not employed in hand,to,hand 
encounters between the knights themselves, but which enabled a man not of 
noble birth to strike a knight from a distance. In condemnation of such 
weapons, the knights found support from the Church. The second Lateran 
Council in 1139 condemned40 the use of the arc and crossbow41 as hateful to 
God, a view coinciding with the concepts of chivalry,42 which regarded 
weapons that could be fired from a distance by a person not a member of the 
profession of arms and out of the potential reach of the intended victim as a 
disgraceful and improper act. The third Lateran Council reiterated its 
anathemization of these weapons, and in 1500 the Corpus Juris Canonicct3 
forbade the use of arrows, darts, or catapults, leading Belli to comment that this 
was done "in order to reduce as far as possible the number of engines of 
destruction and death." However, "regard is so far lacking for this rule that 
firearms of a thousand kinds are the most common and popular implements of 
war; as if too few avenues of death had been discovered in the course of 
centuries, had not the generation of our fathers, rivaling God with his 
lightning, invented this means whereby, even at a single discharge, men are 
sent to perdition by the hundreds."44 
Both Belli's comment and the ideas underlying the approach of the 
canonists, as well as the concepts of the Peace and Truce of God, have much in 
common with the condemnation by Erasmus of the manner in which the 
medieval knight decked himself for war: 
Do you think Nature would recognize the work of her own hand-the image of 
God? And if anyone were to assure her that it were so, would she not break out in 
execrations at the flagitious actions of her favourite creature? Would she not say 
when she saw man thus armed against man, "What new sight do I behold? Hell 
itself must have produced this portentous spectacle .... I would bid this wretched 
creature behold himself in a mirror, if his eyes were capable of seeing himself 
when his mind is no more. Nevertheless, thou depraved animal, look at thyself, if 
thou canst; reflect on thyself, thou frantic warrior, ifby any means thou mayest 
recover thy lost reason, and be restored to thy pristine nature. Take the looking 
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glass, and inspect it. How come that threatening crest of plumes upon thy head? 
Did I give thee feathers! Whence that shining helmet? Whence those sharp 
points, which appear like horns of steel? Whence are thy hands and feet 
furnished with sharp prickles? Whence those scales, like the scales of fish, upon 
thy body? Whence those brazen teeth? Whence those plates of brass all over 
thee? Whence those deadly weapons of offence? Whence that voice, uttering 
sounds of rage more horrible than the inarticulate noise of the wild beasts? 
Whence the whole form of thy countenance and person distorted by furious 
passions, more than brutal? Whence that thunder and lightning which I perceive 
around thee, at once more frightful than the thunder of heaven, and more 
destructive to man? I formed thee an animal a little lower than the angels, a 
partaker of divinity; how camest thou to think of transforming thyself into a beast 
so savage, that no beast hereafter can be deemed a beast, if it be compared with 
man, originally the image of God, the Lord of Creation? "45 
As to the role of the canonists in the development of the law of armed 
conflict, reference should be made to the Peace of God and Truce of God 
movements. It was apparently the violence of the milites raised by feudal lords 
which: 
[F]irst experienced the impetus to restrain violence in the Middle Ages. That 
impetus was the Peace of God movement, whose initial target was precisely the 
bullying milites and those bands of armed men who lived on the edges of 
civilization, preying on settled areas. The Peace of God idea originally appeared 
late in the tenth century; about a generation later came the first appearance of a 
concept generally attached to it in historical interpretation, the Truce of God, 
and a century after that, in 1139, following the ban on crossbows, bows and 
arrows and siege weapons issued by the Second Lateran Council. This last was 
directed principally at mercenaries, who often were organized into fighting units 
around one or the other of these highly specialized and destructive weapons .... 
The beginnings of the Peace of God can be identified at the time of the Council 
of Le Puy in 975 ... imposing on the milites an oath 'to respect the Church's 
possessions and those of the peasants'-provisions that were ultimately to 
become the core of the idea of noncombatant immunity in late-medieval just war 
tradition .... The subsequent idea of the Peace of God ... gradually diminished 
the protection extended to peasants and their property while making more 
explicit the immunity of ecclesiastical persons and property .... In the next 
landmark statement of canon law on this subject, that in the thirteenth century 
De Treuga et Pace, peasants, their goods, and their lands had returned to the 
category of those who did not participate in war and thus should not have war 
made against them. Gradually, other non-Churchly categories of persons were 
added to the list of noncombatants, until by the time of Honore Bonet's L'Arbre 
des Batailles in the fourteenth century the listing had come to include all sorts of 
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secular persons who were noncombatants by virtue of not being knights ... or 
not being physically able to bear arms .... Peasants and clergy alike were defined 
in the former way, while such noncombatant groups as women, children, the 
aged, and the infirm belonged to the latter category ..•. In the shorter run, the 
effect of the Peace of God was not so much to protect peaceful noncombatants ... , 
but to mark off who might legitimately resort to arms and for what end .... [I]n 
the long run, the idea of noncombatant immunity contained within the Peace of 
God developed into a much more universal concept with far,reaching 
implications. This is one of the ... core ideas around which the jus in bello of just 
war tradition developed, and modem humanitarian law of war and moral 
argument centering on the concept of discrimination are legacies of this slender 
tenth,century beginning .... While the Peace of God aimed at protecting certain 
kinds of person and their property . . . the Truce of God [beginning with the 
Council ofT oulouges in 1027] aimed instead to eradicate the use of arms entirely 
during certain periods [-namely the Sabbath, and such holy days as Christmas 
and Lent-] .... Still, the Truce of God applied only among Christians, and this 
meant that violence could still be employed by Christians against non, Christians 
during truce periods. In practice this meant that violence could be directed 
against two main groups: infidels, as in the Crusades; and heretics, as in religious 
persecution .... How did the ban on crossbows, bows and arrows, and siege 
weap.ons contribute to [limiting violence]? ... By the twelfth century the typical 
mercenary belonged to a well, organized band whose leader sold or bartered their 
services as a group and then paid his followers.46 This was the condottori pattern, 
which reached its zenith in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. . . . In the 
Middle Ages, what held these bands together ... was expertise in one or another 
weapon that could be especially telling in the prevailing kind of warfare. 
Specifically mercenary companies were formed around the possession and skilled 
use of bows and arrows and crossbows, neither of which were employed by 
knights but which could be devastating when used against knights, and siege 
machines, these being so expensive and difficult to transport and requiring so 
much skill to use properly that wealthy nobles preferred not to own their own but 
hire mercenary companies specializing in their use. From this it follows easily that 
the new,style mercenaries could be controlled by constraints placed on the use of 
their weapons. The knightly class in particular had good reason to favor such 
restraints, since there was no glory in falling in battle to an arrow shot by a 
commoner and since siege weapons represented the only significant threat to a 
nobleman seeking security from attack in his castle .... "47 
The feudal knights were fully aware of the existence of what they knew as 
the "law of chivalry" or of arrns,48 which regulated their affairs and which was 
enforced by a variety of Courts of Chivalry49 or specially appointed tribunals. 
Thus, in 1474, representatives of the Hanseatic cities tried Peter of Hagen bach 
at Breisach50 for administering occupied territories in a fashion "contrary to the 
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laws of God and of man." His plea that he was only carrying out the orders of his 
prince was rejected and he was executed. 
Since foot soldiers were not regarded as members of the honorable 
profession of arms, the rules of chivalry did not apply to them. However, even 
they were not free to pursue their own fashion of fighting, for this was regulated 
by national codes of arms which could be enforced by commanders exercising 
"rights of justice." Among the earliest of such codes was the "Articles of War" 
promulgated by Richard II in 1385. This forbade, on pain of death, any robbery 
or pillage of a church or an attack on a churchman, as well as "forcing" any 
woman. It also recognized the right of a captor to take his prisoner's parole, 
although: 
[I]f anyone shall take a prisoner, as soon as he comes to the army, he shall 
bring him to his captain or master on pain oflosing his part [of the captive's 
property] ... j and that his said captain or master shall bring him to our lord the 
King, constable or marschall, as soon as he well can, ... in order that they may 
examine him concerning news and intelligence of the enemy ... . "51 
This indicates that war was no longer construed as a conflict between 
individual and individual, but between organized forces with prisoners no 
longer in a master,and,servant relationship with their captors, but instead, 
considered as the "property" of the ruler under whose auspices the captor was 
fighting. 
Perhaps more significant from our point of view, and foretelling much of the 
present law, were the "Articles and Military Lawes to be Observed in the 
Warres" promulgated by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in 1621. 
Art. 85. He that forceth any woman to abuse her, and the matter bee proved, he 
shall die for it. 
Art. 88. No souldier shall set fire upon any Towne or Village in the enemies' 
Land, without he be commanded by his Captain: neither shall any Captain give 
any such command unless he hath first received it from us or our General: who so 
doth the contrary, he shall answer it in the Generals Councell ofWarre .... 
Art. 92. They that pillage or steal either in our Land or in the enemies, ... 
without leave, shall be punish'd as for other theft. 
Art. 94. If any man give himselfe to fall upon the pillage before leave be given him 
so to doe, then may any of his Officers kill him .... 
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Art. 96. No man shall presume to pillage any Church or Hospitall, although the 
Strength be taken by assault; except he be first commanded, or that the Souldiers 
and Burgers be fled thereinto and doe harm, from thence; who dares the 
contrary, shall be punished .... 
Art. 97. No man shall set fire upon any Hospitall, Church, Schoole, or Mill, or 
spoyle them in any way, except he be commanded; neither shall any tyrannize 
any Churchman, or aged people, men or women, maides or children, unless they 
first take up arms against them, under paine of punishment .... 
Art. 98. No souldier shall abuse any Churches, Colledges, Schooles or 
Hospitalls; ... no souldier shall give any disturbance to any person exercising his 
sacred function or Ministery, upon paine of death. 
Art. 113. Our Commanders shall defend the countrey-people and Ploughmen 
that follow their husbandry, and shall suffer none to hinder them in it. 
Art. 116. Whatsoever is not contained in these Articles, and is repugnant to 
Military Discipline, or whereby the miserable and innocent countrey may against 
all right and reason be burdened withall, whatsoever offence finally shall be 
committed against these orders, that shall the severall Commanders make good, 
or see severally punished unlesse themselves will stand bound to give further 
satisfaction. 52 
In 1639 England had a full system of Laws and Ordinances of WaITe53 
regulating the behavior of forces in the field, forbidding, among other things, 
marauding of the countryside, individual acts against the enemy unauthorized 
by a superior, private taking or keeping of booty, or private detention of an 
enemy prisoner. Similar codes existed in Germany and Switzerland. 54 To some 
extent, these codes reflected the principles to be found in various writings on 
military matters and the law of war, including, for example, those of Ayala, De 
Jure et Officiis et Disciplina Militari, 1582; Belli, De Re Militari et Bello Tractatus, 
1663; Gentili, De]ure Belli, 1612; Legnano, De Bello, De Represaliis et De Duello, 
1447; and even Grotius, whose seminal work, De Jure ac Pacis, 1625, is 
frequently treated as if it were the fountainhead of all knowledge on the 
then-existing intemationallaw. In the latter work, Grotius emphasizes that war 
was the normal order of the day. All these to some extent reflected earlier 
works devoted to the Loi des Batailles, and nearly all claimed to be declaring the 
law that armies were obliged to follow. In many cases, they were mere 
abstractions based on existing practice, and it is noticeable how much 
agreement there is across the whole spectrum. These principles drawn from 
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practice and doctrine are expressive of the customs of war and, to a great 
extent, constitute what are now known as the customary law of armed conflict. 
Of the codes it has been said that, combined with the customary rules, they 
form "Ie meilleur frein pratique pour imposer aux armees Ie respect d'un modus 
legitimus de mener les guerres."ss 
As has been mentioned, the principles of chivalry were of universal 
application and they frequently confirmed the immunity from attack or 
capture of hospital staff, chaplains, doctors, surgeons or apothecaries. 
However, while Belli, basing himself on the writings of Bartolus in the 
fourteenth century, asserted that during war the "persons of doctors may not be 
seized, and they may not be haled to court or otherwise harassed, [and] 
attendants may not search them for the carrying of arms,,,S6 there was no 
general recognition of this. To a large extent it depended on the discretion of a 
commander whether medical personnel accompanied his forces and often the 
only one would be his personal physician. However, Gustavus Adolphus had 
four surgeons attached to his regiments and the Armada too carried medical 
personnel, but these only looked after their own. By a decree of Louis XIV of 
1708, a permanent medical service was established "a la suite des armees et 
dans les places de guerre."S7 Even before this, during the siege of Metz in 
1552,3, Fran~ois de Guise had summoned the French surgeon Para "to succour 
the abandoned wounded soldiers of the enemy and to make arrangements for 
their transport back to their army."SB 
I 
By the end of the seventeenth century, occasional agreements were being 
drawn up between rival commanders for mutual respect towards the wounded 
and hospitals. A fairly sophisticated agreement of this kind was entered into 
between the French and English at L'Ecluse in 1759, whereby: 
[H]ospital staff, chaplains, doctors, surgeons and apothecaries were not ... to be 
taken prisoners; and, if they should happen to be apprehended within the lines of 
the enemy, they were to be sent back immediately. The wounded of the enemy 
who should fall into the hands of the opponents were to be cared for .... They 
were not to be made prisoner and might stay in hospital safely under guard. 
Surgeons and servants might be sent to them under the general's passport .... ,,59 
Some twenty years later, in 1780, Peyrilhe proposed international 
recognition of the principle that the wounded should not be made prisoners of 
war nor enter into the balance of exchanges.6o However, it was not until after 
the experiences of Florence Nightingale in the Crimea and the publication of 
Henri Dunant's Souvenir de Solferino in 1862, reporting on the horrors he had 
witnessed at that battle, that Peyrilhe's proposal came to fru~tion, with the 
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establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 186361 and 
the adoption in 1864 of the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded of Armies in the Field.62 
Apart from arrangements and developments of this kind, other customs 
were evolving. During the Hundred Years War, guerre mortale, war to the 
death, was distinguished from bellum hostile, a war between Christian princes 
when prisoners could still ransom themselves, guerre guerriable, fought in 
accordance with the feudal rules of chivalry, and the truce, which included a 
temporary cessation of hostilities during which the wounded and dead might be 
collected, with the resumption of hostilities follOwing a truce considered a 
continuation of an ongoing conflict, rather than the opening of a new one. 
Each had its own rules, but they were rules of honor. 
In medieval and later European wars, the capture of cities was of major 
importance and could be effected by surrender or siege and assault. If by 
agreement, the inhabitants were treated in accordance with its terms, but if by 
assault, there were no legal restrictions, although churchmen, women and 
children were frequently spared. Siege required peculiar weapons, both 
offensive and defensive,63 but as sieges became less frequent and these weapons 
of less value, they tended to fall into desuetude and came to be considered 
illegal,64 only to be replaced by weapons more suited to the newer methods of 
warfare. 
These developments were in line with others which had ensued by the time 
of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia terminating the Thirty Years War. Members 
of fighting units were now mustered in national armies and war was no longer a 
matter of personal relations between princely commanders, with the individual 
soldier entering into a personal contract with his commander-although there 
are still vestiges within national armies of troops being raised by a particular 
nobleman65-and the individual captor no longer had any rights over his 
captive. War was now a matter between sovereigns, and for a legally recognized 
armed conflict to exist there had to be a hostile contention between States by 
means of organized armed forces under a proper disciplinary system.66 At the 
same time, the old distinction between just and unjust wars67 had disappeared, 
and it had become accepted that any war conducted by a Christian prince was 
clearly just,68 although both Suarez and Vitoria had reservations concerning 
Spanish claims to the colonization of the new world.69 
It was not until the American Civil War that there was the first attempt to 
produce a modem code for the conduct of armed forces in the field. Professor 
Francis Lieber of Columbia College drew up what became, by order of 
President Lincoln, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the US in the 
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Field.70 These were so consistent with what were generally accepted practices 
that they formed the basis for similar codes in Prussia, 1870; The Netherlands, 
1871; France, 1877; Russia, 1877 and 1904; Serbia, 1878; Argentina, 1881; 
Great Britain, 1883 and 1904; and Spain, 1893.71 By the Instructions: 
[M]ilitary necessity does not admit of cruelty-that is, the infliction of suffering 
for the sake of suffering or revenge . . . the unarmed citizen is to be spared in 
person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit ... 
protection of the inoffensive citizen of the hostile state is the rule .... The United 
States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion 
and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially 
those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the 
contrary shall be rigorously punished .... All wanton violence committed against 
persons in the invaded country ... all robbery ... or sacking, even after taking a 
place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming or killing of such inhabitants 
are prohibited under the penalty of death. . .. Crimes punishable by all penal 
codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, 
burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a 
hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in 
all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be 
preferred. "72 
Despite the number of countries adopting similar codes, no agreed 
international document acknowledging this existed, although it was generally 
accepted that these postulates constituted principles amounting to 
international customary law and, to the extent that they were not expressly 
rejected by any State, especially a major military power, nor overruled by any, 
treaty, they are as obligatory as any other rules of international law. 
The first international agreement to be generally accepted came at the end 
of the Crimean War with the adoption of the Declaration of Paris, 1856,13 This 
was confined to maritime warfare, forbidding the issue of letters of marque, 
stating that a blockade was only legal if effective, and granting immunity from 
capture to enemy goods on neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships, 
unless they constituted contraband. Of more general significance was the 1864 
Geneva Convention on wounded in the field, already mentioned, which 
recognized the distinctiveness and immunity of the Red Cross and of personnel 
wearing this insignia. This Convention was amended and revised in a series of 
Geneva Conferences extending from 1886 to 1977, with the Conventions of 
1949, as added to by the 1977 Protocols, constituting the current body of 
humanitarian law governing the treatment and protection of those hors de 
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combat, civilians and other noncombatants. This body of law is known as the 
Geneva Law. 74 
In addition to the work done on behalf of those hors de combat, efforts were 
taking place to control the means of conducting warfare. The Russians had 
invented a bullet which exploded on contact, and in 1867 called a conference 
resulting in the Declaration of St. Petersburg. This forbade the use of 
projectiles weighing less than 400 grammes that were explosive or charged with 
fulminating or inflammable substances. The Declaration was of general 
application, applying equally to land and sea warfare. However, its impact was 
limited since it contained an all'participation clause, rendering it inapplicable 
in any war in which any belligerent was not a party. 
Perhaps more significant than the Declaration, was the accompanying 
Preamble, which is important to the present day: 
[T]he progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as 
possible the calamities of war; the only legitimate objective which states should 
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy; for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of 
men; this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly 
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; the 
employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of 
humanity.75 
This document may be considered the precursor of what is now known as the 
Hague Law, concerned with the means and methods of conducting operations 
during armed conflict, which had its origin in a conference called by the Czar in 
1874. The Brussels Protocol aimed at revising "the general usages of war, 
whether with the object of defining them with greater precision, or with the 
view of laying down, by a common agreement, certain limits which will 
restrain, as far as possible, the severities of war." To this end a Project of an 
International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War was 
drafted in the hope tbat "war being thus regulated would involve less suffering, 
would be less liable to those aggravations produced by uncertainty, unforeseen 
events, and the passions created by the struggle; it would tend more surely to 
that which should be its final object, viz., the re-establishment of good 
relations, and a more solid and lasting peace between the belligerent States. "76 
The Project failed for lack of ratifications, but it formed the basis on which 
L'Institut de Droit International drew up its Oxford Manual of the Laws of War 
on Land. According to the Preface: 
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[I]ndependently of the international laws existing on this subject, there are 
certain principles of justice which guide the public conscience, which are 
manifested even by general customs, but which it would be well to fix and make 
obligatory ... [but since it] might be premature or at least very difficult [to obtain 
a treaty, the Manual could serve as the basis for national legislation, as being] in 
accord with both the progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized 
armies. Rash and extreme rules will not be found therein.77 The Institut has not 
sought innovations in drawing up the Manual; it has contented itself with stating 
clearly and codifying the accepted ideas of our age so far as this has appeared 
allowable and practicable."78 
Appreciating the pressures imposed upon the fighting man and the civilian 
when there is an actual combat, the Institute called upon States to disseminate 
the rules among its entire population. 
The Brussels Project and the Oxford Manual, served to inspire the Czar to 
call a Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899. This conference adopted a 
number of Declarations together with a Convention (which was amended in 
1907) that still constitute the basic law in bello. Recognizing the arrival of a 
potentially new means of attack, the Conference adopted a Declaration against 
the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or other similar 
methods. This was replaced in 1907 and remains the only existing 
international agreement on aerial warfare. Further Declarations ban 
projectiles, the only use of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious 
gases, as well as the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human 
body.79 
Most important of the instruments adopted at The Hague is Convention II 
of 1899, now IV of 1907, to which is attached a set of Regulations still 
constituting the basic statement of the law of warfare on land-although its 
principles are now regarded as so fundamental as to amount to customary law 
relevant in all theaters. It is, of course, impossible to cover all eventualities or 
provide for unforeseen developments. For this reason, the parties adopted the 
Martens Clause: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued [, and it never 
has' ], the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases 
not included in the [annexed] Regulations, the inhabitants and the belligerents 
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, 
as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws 
of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.8o 
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This, in somewhat slightly amended form, appears in virtually every subsequent 
agreement concerning humanitarian law in armed conflict. 
At the 1907 Conference, further Conventions, covering the opening of 
hostilities, naval warfare, and the rights and duties of neutrals, were adopted.81 
Since each of these contains an all'participation clause, the Martens Clause, 
with its clear references to chivalry, humanitarianism and accepted usages, 
assumes increased importance. In addition, to the extent that any of the 
provisions in the Regulations, Conventions or Declarations are now 
considered to be declaratory of,82 or having developed into, customary law, 
they will be applicable universally and the wording of the Convention will be 
treated as expressing that law.83 
Hague Convention IV makes no provision for personal liability in the event 
of its breach, but Article 3 provides that "a belligerent party which violates the 
provisions of the Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming 
part of its armed forces." While this is the first "black letter" acknowledgment 
of the enforceability of any of the laws of war, it is merely an affirmation of the 
general principle relating to the liability of a State for breach of treaty or for its 
tortious wrongs or acts of its subordinates. Prior to the establishment of the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal in 1945,84 the only way of 
proceeding against individual offenders was by national tribunals85 applying 
customary law,86 the Regulations,87 or, in the case of their own personnel, the 
national military or criminal code.88 Since Nuremherg, nearly all trials89 for 
offenses against the laws of war have made reference to the principles 
stemming from the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.90 
Probably, the most important provision of the 1907 Regulations is Article 1 
defining the scope of application of the Regulations-armies, militia units, and 
volunteer forces, provided they are commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates, have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carry 
their arms openly, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war. This purview of relevant personnel has been widened 
somewhat by Protocol I of 1977. However, from the point of view of the serving 
soldier, Articles 22 and 23, limiting the means of waging war and the use of 
forbidden weapons (although it may well be difficult for him to know whether a 
particular weapon issued to him is in fact forbidden), as well as forbidding the 
imposition of unnecessary suffering, are those most likely to result in personal 
liability. Even since the adoption of the Protocols, this is still largely the case. 
While no Conference has been called since 1907 to revise or update the 
general laws and customs of war, there have been conventions directed to 
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specific issues, the protection of cultural property in armed conflict,91 the 
prohibition of military or other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques,92 the use of conventional weapons,93 the production, stockpiling 
and use of chemical weapons,94 and, most importantly, the conference that led 
to the adoption of Protocols I and II in 1977. 
In so far as maritime warfare is concerned, in addition to the Hague 
Conventions already mentioned, one of which, Convention XII, sought 
unsuccessfully to set up an International' Prize Court, the Declaration of 
London of 1909,95 is important. The Declaration stated that it contained 
"agreed rules" on blockade, contraband, unneutral service, enemy character, 
convoy, and resistance to search. Though unratified, its substance was in 
accord with generally recognized principles and, by and large, was observed 
during World War 1;96 as recently as 1960, an Egyptian Prize Court, citing the 
Declaration, condemned cargo from Israel on a Greek ship seeking to traverse 
the Suez Canal.97 
Other agreements relating to sea warfare, specifically submarines and 
noxious gases,9B were adopted in London in 1922, but never came into force, 
although the provisions on submarine warfare were confirmed by the London 
Protocol of 1936. Pursuant to the Protocol, in their operations against 
merchant ships, submarines are required to conform to the same rules as 
surface vessels. 
In particular, except in the case of persistent-' refusal to stop on being duly 
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface 
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant 
vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of 
safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless 
the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather 
conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel which is in 
a position to take them on board.99 
World War II practice shows that this rule was more observed in the breach 
than observance. 
Although the parties at The Hague dealt with projectiles from balloons, they 
did not appreciate the potential importance of air warfare. Experience in 
World War I indicated that this was an area which should not be ignored, and 
in 1923 a Conference of Experts drew up agreed Rules of Air Warfare.1oo These 
Rules, however, have never come into force, although they are generally 
regarded as having had sufficient influence for it to be said that "to a great 
extent, they correspond to the customary rules and ge~eral principles 
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underlying the conventions on the law of war on land and at sea.nlOI This view 
was accepted by the Tokyo District Court when considering the legality of the 
dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The Draft Rules of Air Warfare cannot directly be called positive law, since they 
have not become effective as authoritative with regard to air warfare. However, 
international jurists regard the Draft Rules as authoritative with regard to air 
warfare. Some countries regard the substance of the Rules as a standard of action 
by armed forces, and the fundamental provisions of the Draft Rules are 
consistently in conformity with international law regulations, and customs at 
that time [1945].102 
While the United States Department of the Air Force does not recognize 
the Code as customary law, it does in fact often draw attention to the 
compatibility of its own rules with those adopted in 1923.103 Moreover, to the 
extent that these Rules may be declaratory of general customary law, they apply 
to air warfare, and by Protocol I the rules concerning the general protection of 
the civilian population "apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect 
the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They 
further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on 
land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict at sea or in the air.nlO4 
Although the use of poison has been condemned since classical times, 
poison gas was used during World War I. In 1925 the Geneva Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was adopted. lOS Many countries 
contend that this does not extend to non,fatallachrymose or nerve gases, while 
others reserve the right to use it, for example, to suppress riots in 
prisoner,of,war camps. Others state they will only apply it as between 
themselves and belligerents who have also ratified the Protocol, and yet others 
claim the right to use gas against a belligerent who has employed it against their 
forces or xhose of their allies. While there are reports that gas and other 
chemical weapons were used by Italy against Ethiopia, by Iraq against Kurdish 
rebels, and, perhaps during the Gulf War, it is likely that the Protocol would 
now be regarded as declaratory of customary law, at least so far as first use is 
concerned. Moreover, as recently as 1993, a further Convention sought to 
extend the Protocol so as to ban the manufacture, stockpiling, or use of any 
chemical weapons.106 
Experience in World War II made it clear that the law as it existed in 1939 
was no longer adequate, even though, as pointed out by the Nuremberg 
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Tribunal, the rules embodied in Hague Convention N and the annexed 
Regulations "were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as 
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war," and as such applicable to all 
belligerents, whether party to that instrument or not. The same view was taken 
of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relating to Prisoners of War,107 a finding 
that was particularly important since neither the Soviet Union 108 nor Japan was 
a party thereto, although Japan stated it would abide by its provisions;l09 
Germany contended that it did not apply to protect Soviet prisoners. 
Perhaps the most significant development in the law of war to result from 
World War II was the promulgation of the London Charter establishing the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,l1O with jurisdiction over crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. To the extent that it 
was merely exercising its jurisdiction in accordance with the Charter, the 
Tribunal was not itself creating any law. While not directly concerned with 
regulating the conduct of hostilities, perhaps the major innovation was the 
holding by the Tribunal that a war of aggression or in breach of treaty was a 
crime, though criticism may be directed at the manner in which the Tribunal 
concluded that the Pact of Paris, III whereby the parties renounced war as an 
instrument of national policy, had made resort to "aggressive" war an 
international crime; for the Tribunal, it was "not only an international crime: it 
is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that 
it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."m Surprisingly, 
however, none of the accused found guilty of this "supreme" crime, but not 
additional "lesser" war crimes, was sentenced to death. 
As to war crimes in the traditional sense of that term, the Tribunal added 
little except to hold that status of the accused, even as head of state or 
commander in chief, would not provide immunity from prosecution, and 
confirm that superior orders was not a defense to a war crimes charge, but could 
be pleaded in mitigation. The other innovation was the concept of crimes 
against humanity. This offense related to breaches of the law against civilians, 
even those of the same nationality as the perpetrator. While there has been a 
tendency to assume that this was a major development of a general character, it 
should not be forgotten that, as defined in both the Charter and the Judgment, 
crimes against humanity were committed only if they were part and parcel of 
the war of aggression or of war crimes. Moreover, strictly speaking, once the 
Tribunal was functus officio, this concept should have become of less 
significance. l13 However, with the development of the law concerning human 
rights and humanitarian law, and in an attempt to create a system for 
prosecuting crimes committed in a noninternational conflict, the application 
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of the concept was widened. Perhaps the most significant statement to this 
effect is to be found in the Interim Report of the Commission established to 
investigate crimes committed during the civil war in Rwanda: 
If the normative content of "crimes against humanity" had remained frozen in its 
Nuremberg form, then it could not possibly apply to the situation in Rwanda ... 
because there was not a "war" in the classic sense of an inter,State or 
i.nternational armed conflict. 
However, the normative content of "crimes against humanity"-originally 
employed by the Nuremberg tribunal for its own specific purposes in connection 
with the Second World War-has undergone a substantial evolution .... 
"[C]rimes against humanity" finds its very origins in "principles of humanity" 
first invoked in the early 1800s by a State to denounce another State's human 
rights violations of its own citizens. Thus, "crimes against humanity" as a 
juridical concept was conceived early on to apply to individuals regardless as to 
whether or not the criminal act was perpetrated during a state of armed conflict 
or not and regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or victim. The content 
and legal status of the norm since Nuremberg has been broadened and expanded 
through certain international human rights instruments adopted by the United 
Nations since 1945 .... 
The Commission of Experts on Rwanda considers1l4 that "crimes against 
humanity" are gross violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human 
rights law committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to the conflict as 
part of an official policy based on discrimination against an identifiable group of 
persons, irrespective of war and the nationality of the victims. ll5 
It should be pointed out here that many commentators would today question 
whether such crimes need to be the consequence of a determined policy based 
on discrimination. 
Just as it would now be considered as part of the law that crimes against 
humanity are not confined to an international armed conflict, so we find that 
the 1948 Genocide Convention, which deals with acts directed at the 
destruction of a defined group qua group, expressly states in Article 1 that 
"genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime 
under international law.,,116 There should, therefore, be no difficulty in 
applying this ConventioI,l in any conflict, whether international or 
noninternational, when the acts condemned are directed at a defined group 
with the intention of destroying its group characteristics. Since most crimes 
against humanity, as defined in the London Charter or international 
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agreements on human rights, do not normally amount to offenses as grave as 
genocide, it should be possible in the future to charge those responsible for 
genocide with crimes against humanity, without having to prove "intent" for 
genocide is clearly the gravest of all crimes against humanity. 
The General Assembly adopted a resolution Affirming the Principles of 
International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg T ribunal.l17 As 
a General Assembly resolution, it lacks any strict legal force, although it 
embodies great political and moral authority. This authority has been 
enhanced by the International Law Commission's enunciation of Principles of 
International Law recognized by the Charter and Judgment.us Principle I 
affirmed the personal liability of anyone committing a crime under 
international law; Principle II provides that the failure of national law to 
condemn a particular act does not remove personal liability for that act under 
international law; Principle III prohibits a head of state from claiming 
immunity from international criminal liability; Principle IV holds that superior 
orders cannot be pleaded when a moral choice was open to an accused; 
Principle V entitles war criminals to a fair trial; Principle VI confirms the 
criminality of the acts condemned in the London Charter; and Principle VII 
reaffirms the Tribunal's finding that complicity in any of these acts is itself a 
crime. These Principles have been reaffirmed by the Commission in its Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.u9 
From the point of view of the law in bello, the most important development 
after 1945 was the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions in 1949. 
Conventions I, II, and III, 120 -addressing the wounded and sick on land and at 
sea, as well as prisoners of war-are little more than reaffirmations and 
extensions of the 1929 Conventions, with amendments directed at filling 
lacunae, which became apparent during World War II. More innovative was 
Convention IV concerning the protection of civilians in time of war, 
particularly in occupied territory,121 an issue which had become of supreme 
concern in the light of German practice in occupied Europe. 
Further, since 1945 it had become obvious that many or most of the conflicts 
that had occurred or were likely in the foreseeable future were not 
international conflicts in the normal inter,State sense, but rebellions, 
revolutions, or struggles for national independence. It is for this reason that the 
Conventions replace the term "war," with its inter,State connotation, by 
"armed conflict" and "enemy" by "adverse party"-although the mind boggles 
at the idea of an infantry sergeant saying, "Hold your fire until you see the white 
of the adverse party's eyes!" In such conflicts, ideological differences frequently 
result in atrocities far more outrageous than any of those normally inherent in 
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an international conflict. In view of this, each of the Conventions has, as its 
Article 3, what may be regarded as a minimal code of humanitarian law to be 
followed "in the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." In addition, 
each contains a definition of those breaches of the Convention which are 
considered "grave," and which are declared to be criminally punishable, 122 
Parties agree to amend their legal systems to ensure the punishment of such 
offenses. However, the relevant article never refers to the provisions of Article 
3 common to the Conventions. But, if this Article is to have any meaning, it 
follows that disregard of the provisions therein embodied must be enforceable; 
thus, offenders must be punishable. Moreover, the offenses listed in the 
Conventions, regardless of the specific Article concerned, are, for the most 
part, offenses which would amount to crimes against humanity and be 
punishable as such. The listing of particular offenses as "grave breaches" does 
not remove the criminal character from other acts which would amount to war 
crimes. 
Adoption of the Civilians Convention in 1949 was still not regarded as 
sufficient to satisfy the purpose for which it was promulgated. Therefore, in 
1968, the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran adopted a 
Resolution calling for Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, 123 
although none of its Resolutions carries legal force. However, they introduced 
a new idea to the effect that those engaged in "struggles" against "minority 
racist or colonial regimes" should not be treated as traitors but as prisoners of 
war or political prisoners. This added to the impact of the General Assembly's 
resolution124 confirming the assertion of the 1965 Conference of the Red Cross 
on the Protection of Civilian Populations against the Dangers ofIndiscriminate 
Warfare: 
(i) the right of parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited; 
(ii) it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population, as such; 
(iii) distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the 
hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be 
spared as much as possible.125 
Carrying the proposals further, the Institute of International Law, at its 
Edinburgh Conference of 1969, adopted a Resolution on the distinction 
between military and nonmilitary objects, particularly the problems associated 
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with weapons of mass destruction.126 In view of the status of the Institute, its 
views cannot be ignored, even though the United States "does not accept them 
as an accurate statement of internationallaw relating to armed conflict ... 
[but] regard[s] as declaratory of existing customary law ... [the] general 
principles recognized [and] unanimously adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly."127 However, bearing in mind the importance of opinio juris, 
some reference to the Institute's views must be made. 
First, the Institute made reference to the "consequences which the 
indiscriminate conduct of hostilities and particularly the use of nuclear, 
chemical and bacteriological weapons, may involve for civilians and for 
mankind as a whole ... [and went on to enunciate] the principles to be 
observed in armed conflicts by any de jure or de facto government, or by any 
other authOrity responsible for the conduct of hostilities." 128 It emphasized that 
the distinction between military and nonmilitary objectives, as well as between 
combatants and civilians, must be constantly preserved; that neither the 
civilian population nor specially agreed protected establishments may ever be 
regarded as military objectives, nor "under any circumstances" may the means 
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population or those which serve 
primarily humanitarian purposes; that all existing protective principles of 
international armed conflict law must be preserved and observed; and that 
[E]xisting intemationallaw prohibits, irrespective of the type of weapon used, 
any action whatsoever designed to terrorize the civilian population .... [and] 
prohibits the use of all weapons which, by their nature, affect indiscriminately 
both military objectives and non-military objects, or both armed forces and 
civilian populations. In particular, it prohibits the use of weapons the destructive 
effect of which is so great that it cannot be limited to specific military objectives 
or is othenvise uncontrollable (self-generating weapons), as well as "blind" 
weapons. [It also] prohibits all attacks for whatsoever motives or by whatsoever 
means for the annihilation of any group, region or urban centre with no possible 
distinction between armed forces and civilian populations or between military 
and non-military objectives.129 
The General Assembly subsequently adopted a Resolution which broadly 
accepted the principles laid down by the Institute. However, it went somewhat 
further, in that, while affirming the principles for the protection of civilians, it 
asserted that "fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and 
laid down in international agreements, continue to apply fully in situations of 
armed conflict.,,130 This appears to be a new departure from previous 
understanding, for it would normally be thought that as lex specialis the Hague 
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and Geneva Law overrode the lex generalis of human rights instruments which 
might be considered applicable in peacetime, especially as these latter 
instruments usually recognize that most, but not all, of their provisions are 
derogable in time of emergency, including armed conflict. l31 
Since this Resolution was adopted without any opposition, it might be 
assumed that the members of the international community thought that the 
principles therein enunciated amounted to an expression of customary law, 
which would render the United States reservations concerning the Institute's 
proposals of less significance than they appear at first glance. 
There followed the adoption of a Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and their Destruction in 1972,132 but this was silent as to use. 
Difficulties arose in relation to chemical weapons and a further, as yet 
unratified, Convention was adopted in 1993 directed against the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
their Destruction. 133 
All these proposals with regard to the means and methods of warfare led the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to propose amendments to the 1949 
Conventions in an effort to meet some of the concerns now apparent. The 
Conference that ensued met from 1974 to 1977 and produced two Protocols 
supplementing, but not in any way replacing, the 1949 Conventions-Ion 
international and II on noninternational armed conflicts.134 
Apart from bringing the law up to date, Protocol I makes fundamental 
changes in the existing law regulating international armed conflicts and, while 
formally concerned with humanitarian law as propounded in the Geneva law, 
does in fact add to some of the Hague law concerning means and methods. 
Most importantly, recognizing the principles of political correctness and 
concerns regarding self,determination, it provides that struggles conducted by 
national liberation movements in the name of self,determination are to be 
considered international conflicts and thus subject to the intemationallaw of 
armed conflict.135 It also changes the definition of combatants on behalf of the 
members of such movements, even though they are not wearing recognized 
uniforms nor carrying their arms openly save when actually engaged and visible 
to the adversary while preparing to engage.136 The Protocol extends the 
protection given to civilian and nonmilitary objects and forbids actions likely to 
have a deleterious effect upon civilians. Thus, it forbids attacks upon narrowly 
defined "dangerous installations"-dams, dykes and nuclear electrical 
generating stations. Changing long,recognized law, it defines mercenaries and 
denies them prisoner of war status. It widens the concept of grave breaches as 
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defined in the Conventions, and recognizes civil defense as a matter requiring 
separate acknowledgment. In an effort to make the law clearly understood, it 
requires legal advisers to be attached to military units, without specifying the 
level of attachment, and expressly confirms the principle of command 
responsibility, including the obligation of a commander to ensure compliance 
with the law by his subordinates by imposing a duty to suppress, repress and 
punish offenders. 
The Protocol reflects many of the principles adopted by the Institute at its 
Edinburgh meeting, but ignores completely any reference to weapons of mass 
destruction other than by implication when forbidding long, term damage to 
the environment or insisting on the preservation of material essential to the 
sustenance of the civilian population. The reason put forward for ignoring the 
problems of the nuclear weapon was that this was essentially an issue of 
disarmament rather than humanitarian law. Nevertheless, when the General 
Assembly subsequently asked the World Court for an advisory opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use ofNudear Weapons, 137 the Court found itself unable 
to give a direct answer, though it had some difficulty in leaving the issue 
completely open. 
The Court not having found a conventional rule of general scope, nor a 
customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per 
se, it will now deal with the question whether recourse to nuclear weapons must 
be considered as illegal in the light of the principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict .... 
[The] two branches of law applicable in armed conflict [-the Hague and 
Geneva law-] have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to 
have gradually formed one complex system, known today as international 
humanitarian law .... 
Since the tum of the century, the appearance of new means of combat 
has-without calling into question the long-standing principles and rules of 
international law-rendered necessary some specific prohibitions of the use of 
certain weapons .... 
The cardinal principles constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are [as 
follows]. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and 
civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants. States must never make civilians the object of attack and must 
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between 
civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to 
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cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use 
weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. 
[Accordingly,] States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the 
weapons they use. 
The Court would refer, in relation to these principles, to the Martens Clause ... 
which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of 
niilitary technology. A modem version ... is to be found in Additional Protocol I 
of 1977Ys 
In conformity with the aforementioned principles, humanitarian law, at a very 
early stage, prohibited certain types of weapons either because of their 
indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of unnecessary 
suffering caused to combatants, that is to say, a harm greater than that 
unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives. If an envisaged use of 
weapons would not meet the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to 
engage in such use would also be contrary to that law .... [T]hese fundamental 
rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the 
conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible 
principles ofintemational customary law [-1 jus cogens-] . ... 
Turning now to the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law 
to a possible threat or use of nuclear weapons .... 
The Court shares th[e] view [that] there can be no doubt as to the applicability 
of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons .... Indeed, nuclear weapons were 
invented after most of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflicts had already come into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and 
1974,1977 [which drew up the Conventions and Protocols] left these weapons 
aside, and there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative difference between 
nuclear weapons and all conventional arms. However, it cannot be concluded 
from this that the established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable 
in armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be 
incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles 
in question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all 
forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the 
present and those of the future .... 
Finally, the Court points to the Martens Clause, whose continuing existence and 
applicability is not to be doubted, as an affirmation that the principles and rules 
of humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons .... 
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Although the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law ... to 
nuclear weapons is hardly disputed, the conclusions to be drawn from this 
applicability are ... controversial. ... 
[N] one of the States advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under 
certain circumstances, including the "clean" use of nuclear, low yield, tactical 
nuclear weapons [-which, in view of their radio-activity, would still be likely to 
cause "unnecessary" suffering to combatant victims-] has indicated what, 
supposing such limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances 
justifying such use; nor whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into 
the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons [-is this comment of legal 
significance?-]. This being so, the Court does not consider that it has a 
sufficient basis for a determination on the validity of this view. 
Nor can the Court make a determination upon the validity of the view that the 
recourse to nuclear weapons would be illegal in any circumstance owing to their 
inherent and total incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict. 
Certainly, ... the principles and rules oflaw applicable in armed conflict-at the 
heart of which is the overriding consideration of humanity-make the conduct 
of armed hostilities subject to a number of strict requirements. Thus, methods 
and means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian 
and military targets, or which would result in unnecessary suffering to 
combatants, are prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear 
weapons ... the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with 
respect for such requirements. Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not 
have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of 
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of 
law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstances. 
Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every 
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake. 139 Nor can it ignore the 
practice referred to as the "policy of deterrence" [-a legal issue for a 
Court?-], to which an appreciable section of the international community 
adhered for many years .... 
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole ... 
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot 
reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very 
survival would be at stake .... 140 
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As if aware of the somewhat unsatisfactory nature of its answers, the Court 
referred to the varying views that exist at present on this matter and called for 
an early conference to settle the entire issue oflegality, reminding the members 
of the international community of their obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
Having thus seen the Court's comments on the legality of the nuclear 
weapon and its reference to the absence of mention in the Conventions or 
Protocol I, it is perhaps in order to consider the significance of this instrument. 
Although both Protocols constitute an annex to the Conventions, they do not 
automatically become part thereof and, as such, binding upon Convention 
parties. Ratification or accession remains necessary, and there is much debate 
as to the extent to which the provisions in Protocol I are declaratory of 
customary law relevant to international conflicts and therefore binding 
regardless of accession. Perhaps it is sufficient in this connection to refer to the 
Report submitted by General Colin Powell to the Defense Department of the 
United States in regard to the Gulf War of 1991 in which the Coalition forces 
were under his overall command. Many of the combatants in this conflict, 
including both Iraq and the United States, had failed to ratify or accede. 
Nevertheless, Powell pointed out that to the greatest extent feasible, the 
limitations imposed by Protocol I were observed and that "decisions were 
impacted by legal considerations at every level. ... [T]he law of war proved 
invaluable in the decision,making process" in regard to action taken. H1 By way 
of contrast, Protocol II, as the first international effort to regulate such a 
domestic matter as a noninternational conflict, is clearly innovative. 
Even though there has, as yet, been no instrument regulating the legality of 
the use of nuclear weapons, there has been some progress with regard to 
conventional weapons, that is to say those not of massive destruction potential, 
although they may in fact be indiscriminatory. Thus, in 1980, a Convention 
was adopted on the Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or 
Have Indiscriminatory Effects.Hz This comprised three Protocols. The first 
prohibits weapons "the primary purpose of which is to injure by fragments 
which in the human body escape detection by X,rays," although it is not 
believed any such exist or are likely to be invented in the foreseeable future. 
Protocol II is concerned with land mines, booby traps and other similar devices, 
its main aim being to protect civilians from such weapons, while at the same 
time preventing their use against troops in a perfidious manner, as would be the 
case if they were used in connection with protective emblems or, for example, 
corpses. Finally, Protocol III prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary weapons 
if fire is the primary rather than incidental or consequential outcome. While 
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incendiaries have become of less significance with the increased resort to 
mechanized warfare, particularly when long,distance (as compared with 
trench or house,to,house combat), incendiaries remain significant when used 
against armored vehicles or aircraft. Consequently, the Protocol excludes from 
its purview. 
(i) Munitions which may have incidental incendiary effects, such as luminants, 
tracers, smoke or signaling systems; 
(ii) Munitions designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects 
with an additional incendiary effect, such as armour'piercing projectiles, 
fragmentation shells, explosive bombs and similar combined,effects munitions in 
which the incendiary effect is not specifically designed to cause bum injury to 
persons, but to be used against military objectives, such as armoured vehicles, 
aircraft and installations or facilities.143 
This last sub, paragraph leaves one with the impression that the draftsmen were 
of opinion that "armoured vehicles, aircraft and installations or facilities" exist 
in themselves, without any human being required to make them militarily 
effective. 
In 1995, a fourth Protocol was added to these three to control the use of 
Blinding Laser Weapons. As with incendiaries, the ban is only directed at the 
employment of: 
[L]aser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of 
their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, 
that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices .... 
Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military 
employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical 
equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol. l44 
Interestingly, this would seem to remove one of the considerations normally 
applicable when construing whether an offense has been committed against 
the law of war amounting to a war crime. In most cases, it is now accepted that 
if an illegal consequence amounting to a breach was "foreseeable or considered 
likely," liability would follow. In this case, however, even though it is very likely 
that in using laser weapons against optical equipment blindness may well 
ensue, such use is not considered to amount to illegality, even though it is 
known that this is likely to be the case. 
It was pointed out earlier that most of the provisions of the law of war are 
only applicable in the event of an international armed conflict, including such 
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conflicts as may be considered to be on behalf of self~determination, and that 
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions does not really carry this 
much further, unless one is able to argue that breach of the various provisions 
in that Article amounts to crimes against humanity. The 1977 Additional 
Protocol II to the 1949 Conventions sought to provide some measure of 
humanitarian principles into noninternational conflicts. However, the 
threshold for this Protocol to come into effect is so high that it would exclude 
almost every noninternational conflict other than one which amounts to a civil 
war with the antigovernment forces in effective control of some part of the 
national territory, a requirement which is not imposed in the case of a war for 
national liberation: 
Art. 1 (1) This Protocol ... shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not 
[elevated by Protocol I into international conflicts] which take place in the 
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol. 145 
As if to emphasize this high threshold and to make it clear that there is no 
undue interference with national sovereignty and the power of a government 
to deal with opposition and affirm its right to maintain order, the Article 
expressly declares that the "Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence 
and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts,"146 and, as we 
have just seen, nor would it apply, even if the armed incidents were far more 
extensive and serious, if those opposing the go:vernment were not in control 
over part of the national territory. Further limiting the possible impact of the 
Protocol on the conflict, Article 2 makes clear that the Protocol cannot: 
[B] e invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the 
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or 
re~establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and 
territorial integrity of the State ... [nor] as a justification for intervening, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or 
external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that 
conflict occurs.147 
While the Protocol makes no attempt to suggest that the decision as to 
"legitimate" means of restoring order belongs to any authority other than the 
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government concerned, it cannot, despite the ban on intervention, inhibit the 
Security Council from deciding, as it has in the case of the former Yugoslavia 
and of Rwanda, that the situation is so grievous that it amounts to a threat to 
international peace warranting action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and 
authorizing action despite the traditional reservations concerning 
nonintervention in domestic affairs. 
The cheapest and most easily accessible weapon available to those involved 
in a noninternational conflict, especially those confronting the governmental 
forces, are mines and booby traps, but the 1980 Protocol relevant thereto only 
applies in an international armed conflict. However, since mines and booby 
traps are so easily made, are relatively inexpensive, and cause extensive injury 
to civilians even after the conflict has terminated, when the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons was amended in 1993, Protocol II on mines was also 
amended.148 By virtue of this amendment, the Protocol was extended to 
situations mentioned in Article 3 common to the four Conventions, that is to 
say to noninternational conflicts-although the reservation with regard to 
riots and the like was preserved, leaving it open to both combatants in such a 
situation to behave as indiscriminately in this regard as might please them. 
While the ban is applicable to all parties, the reservations with regard to 
sovereignty are also preserved. In an effort to reduce the dangers to civilians, 
particularly after the end of hostilities, the amended Protocol contains 
carefully spelled,out regulations concerning the marking and identification of 
mined areas as well as provision for their ultimate removal. The Protocol does 
not ban the use of all mines, but only those which are strictly anti,personnel 
and which lack self,destructive, self,neutralizing, or self, deactivating 
mechanisms or are fitted with an anti, handling device. While it seeks to limit 
the use of these mines, the Protocol does not make the obtaining of such 
weaponry illegal, nor forbid their manufacture or supply to those seeking them. 
In fact, those countries which are capable of the mass production of mines 
tend, at present, to be opposed to any international agreement which will limit 
their right to manufacture or use, especially in circumstances of self,defense, 
even though they express willingness not to supply them to those countries 
seeking them on the international market. 
This historical introduction to the law of armed conflict has paid most 
attention to warfare upon land since this is the region for which most 
agreements have been designed, while the earliest beginnings of regulation 
were directed to land warfare. Where it has been considered essential, specific 
reference has been made to both aerial and naval warfare, especially since the 
principles underlying the laws and customs of warfare on land are general in 
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character and equally applicable, to the extent that is practicable, to operations 
at sea and in the air as well. Equally, nothing has been said about neutrality. 
This is partly due to the fact that in modem war there are few neutrals, 
particularly when the States which are neutral are weaker than the belligerents 
and therefore have difficulty in asserting their rights against those of the latter. 
Moreover, since virtually all States are members of the United Nations and 
thus bound to carry out any decisions of the Security Council,149 and, since no 
military action is legal without Security Council consent or approval, it may be 
argued that no State can any longer claim to be entitled to the rights 
traditionally pertaining to neutrality. This is particularly so when operations 
are undertaken to give effect to a Security Council decision, a matter that 
became of some importance during the Gulf War of 1991.150 
In addition to any international agreements that may be relevant, as pointed 
out by the World Court in its opinion on The Threator Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
the law of armed conflict is still governed by those "principles of international 
law derived from established custom [-going back to feudal times and 
before-]' from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience,"151 together with such considerations of proper behavior as 
amount to general principles of law recognized by civilized nations152 and, as 
such, rules of international law in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice. Further, there is nothing to prevent any 
State from laying down any rules regulating the conduct of its own forces, 
provided they do not run counter to any established rules and customs of the 
law of armed conflict, and, as we have seen, breaches of these rules may now be 
considered as amounting to crimes against humanity, and punishable as such, 
whether the conflict is one that is international or noninternational in 
character. Equally, since it is generally accepted that the law concerning armed 
conflict is of universal interest, there is nothing to stop any individual State, as 
many have in fact done, from passing legislation granting its courts jurisdiction 
over breaches of this law regardless of the nationality of the offender or of the 
victim. Nor is the geographic location of the offense of any significance. Finally, 
as may be seen with the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it is open to the Security Council, having decided that 
a particular conflict, whether international or noninternational, amounts to a 
potential threat to international peace, to proceed to establish special courts 
with power to enforce the law and punish offenders. 
In fine, perhaps it might be suggested that the time is now ripe for a further 
effort to be made, perhaps under the auspices of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross or the International Law Commission, to draw up a revised 
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and up,to,date statement of what the laws, as distinct from the customs of war, 
are.153 If this should be considered impossible or impracticable, perhaps those 
States which are of like mind, as for example is the case with the members of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or those of the European Community 
with the addition of the United States, would work together to draw up an 
agreed upon code which will be applicable to their forces and which might 
serve as an example to be adopted by others. 
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